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Abstract
Firm-level data often show diﬀerent modes of market access by ﬁrms with the same
productivity levels, which is a mere knife-edge case in the basic ﬁrm heterogeneity
model. This paper examines the foreign direct investment (FDI) decisions of individual
ﬁrms with a simple framework, where ﬁrms and managers have to make matches for
production. We ﬁnd that predicted distributions of FDI ﬁrms are much more akin to
real data than those suggested by the basic ﬁrm heterogeneity model, namely, there
exists a range of ﬁrm productivities in which more productive ﬁrms may export while
less productive ﬁrms may undertake FDI. Such a range of ﬁrm productivities becomes
wider when either matching frictions increase or trade costs decline. Furthermore,
matching frictions hurt production eﬃciency more for productive FDI ﬁrms than for
less productive FDI ﬁrms.
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 1 Introduction
Exploiting detailed ﬁrm-level data, a large body of empirical studies has revealed that
ﬁrms engaged in international activities, such as FDI and exports, are rare, greater in their
operation scale, and more productive than ﬁrms that do not enter international markets.1
These empirical regularities are supported by theoretical contributions by Melitz (2003),
Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum (2003), Yeaple (2005), and others. In particular, for its
clarity, the Melitz model is widely applied to explain the characteristics of internationalized
ﬁrms. For example, extending the Melitz model, Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004) show
a hierarchy among ﬁrms: only the more productive ﬁrms are internationalized and the most
productive ﬁrms among this group choose FDI to serve the foreign markets.2
However, the hierarchy among ﬁrms is not necessarily so clear as the theory predicts,
once we start to scrutinize empirical data. For example, Wakasugi, Toda, Sato, Nishioka,
Matsuura, Ito, and Tanaka (2008) ﬁnd that the productivity advantage of FDI ﬁrms over
exporting ﬁrms is quite small although FDI ﬁrms tend to be more productive than exporters
and ﬁrms serving the domestic market only. In particular, they observe that even in the
group of the most productive ﬁrms, while quite a large number of ﬁrms choose FDI, an
equally large number of ﬁrms choose exports.
In this paper, I examine the foreign direct investment decisions of individual ﬁrms in
order to reconcile the empirical ﬁndings with the theoretical predictions of the pecking order
of internationalization. In so doing, I extend the Melitz model by incorporating a simple
search and matching framework. The model is based on the premise that ﬁrms have to
search for managers who adroitly manage production with product expertise and knowl-
edge about local business environments. It is not diﬃcult for ﬁrms to collect information
about potential managers in their home country. However, this does not necessarily hold
when searching for managers in foreign countries. Matches in foreign countries tend to be
associated with uncertainty about the quality of managers. As a result of matching with
low quality managers, ﬁrms may not fully exert their intrinsic productivity level in foreign
1For example, see Bernard and Jensen (1995, 1999) for U.S. ﬁrms, Mayer and Ottaviano (2007) for
European ﬁrms, Wakasugi, Toda, Sato, Nishioka, Matsuura, Ito, and Tanaka (2008) and Kimura and Kiyota
(2007) for Japanese ﬁrms. It is also widely known that ﬁrms own foreign production facilities are even more
productive than ﬁrms engaged in exports only (e.g., Yeaple (2008) and Tomiura (2007).
2Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2007) extend the Melitz model by putting it in a Heckscher-Oline frame-
work. Bustos (2007) incorporates technology adoption into the Melitz model and shows that exporters tend
to adopt more advanced technology.
1production (FDI).3 Worse, even highly productive ﬁrms may not ﬁnd appropriate mangers
and be forced to choose exports rather than FDI.
This is not the ﬁrst study that attempts to reconcile the implication derived from the
standard Melitz model with the empirical fact that ﬁrms do not enter foreign markets
according to an exact pecking order based on ﬁrms’ productivities. Indeed, Eaton, Kortum,
and Kramarz (2008) modify the Melitz model by allowing ﬁrms to receive stochastic shocks
over foreign demands and ﬁxed market entry costs. Using the data of French ﬁrms, they
estimate that ﬁrms’ underlying productivity heterogeneity explains about half the variation
across ﬁrms in market entry and sales. Arkolakis (2008) introduces endogenous marketing
costs into the Melitz model. Firms optimally choose their marketing costs, which are partly
composed of ﬁxed market entry costs, taking into account their underlying productivities.
Thus, ﬁrms may have diﬀerent levels of ﬁxed costs, which result in a novel extensive margin
caused by ﬁrms’ deepening market penetration.
I specify the search-match mechanism based on contributions of Rauch and Trindade
(2003) and Grossman and Helpman (2005). Allowing for matching frictions between ﬁrms
and managers is important in at least two respects. First, we ﬁnd that the model can
reproduce ﬁrm distributions much more akin to those observed in empirical data. The
productivity of foreign aﬃliates is determined by both ﬁrms’ intrinsic productivity and the
quality of the match with local managers. Thus, the foreign aﬃliates of ﬁrms with relatively
high intrinsic productivity may fail if they have very low quality managers. Simultaneously,
these matching frictions may provide relatively unproductive ﬁrms with a very high match
quality and enable them to enter foreign markets through FDI. However, ﬁrms with low
intrinsic productivity are considerably sensitive to match quality. As a result, ﬁrms very
close to the threshold productivity level are highly unlikely to choose FDI. As ﬁrms’ intrin-
sic productivity rises, the chance of successful FDI progressively increases. This mechanism
contributes to more realistic ﬁrm distributions, namely, there exists a range of ﬁrm pro-
ductivities in which more productive ﬁrms may export while less productive ﬁrms may
undertake FDI. Such a range of ﬁrm productivities becomes wider when either matching
frictions increase or trade costs decline.
Second, the model has endogenous market entry costs in the form of payments toward
local managers. Matched pairs of a ﬁrm and a manager make bargaining over FDI surplus.
3I do not deal with organizational issues in this paper. Thus, what I call FDI in this paper can be
arms-length transactions such as outsourcing or licensing.
2The foreign manager demands their status-quo payoﬀs plus their share of net FDI surplus.
In the model, while the status-quo payoﬀs are common among managers, the net FDI surplus
varies across ﬁrms, depending on ﬁrms’ intrinsic productivity levels and match quality. On
average, ﬁrms with low intrinsic productivity earn smaller FDI surplus. Thus, ﬁrms’ market
entry costs (i.e., payments to local managers) are endogenous and ﬁrms with productivity
close to threshold levels pay a smaller amount of market entry costs. Consequently, the
model provides another view of the microeconomic structure of market entry costs and
complements Arkolakis (2008).
A number of studies are related to this work. The closest are Eaton, Kortum, and
Kramarz (2008) and Arkolakis (2008), which have already been mentioned above. In the
literature on FDI, Nocke and Yeaple (2008, 2007) recently developed a general equilibrium
model in which ﬁrms produce diﬀerentiated goods with combining two distinct capabilities:
one is internationally mobile and the other is not. Using this framework, they consider two
diﬀerent modes of FDI, mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and greenﬁeld FDI. They also
consider the pecking order of modes of internationalization, but they do not examine the
issue of overlapped productivity range, which is the main concern of this study. Grossman
and Helpman (2005) study international matching between ﬁnal good producers and inter-
mediate good suppliers. In this sense, their study is very close to mine. However, their
main focus is on the thick market eﬀect. Also, they do not deal with ﬁrm heterogeneity.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in the next section, I describe the model,
and Section 3 discusses its properties. Section 4 provides a numerical example of the model.
Section 5 concludes and discusses issues that should be studied more deeply.
2 The Model
This section lays out a two-country model that contains two sectors and a continuum of po-
tentially heterogeneous ﬁrms. One sector (sector Z) competitively produces a homogenous,
numeraire good from labor. The other sector (sector Y ) produces a continuum of diﬀer-
entiated varieties. In this sector, each ﬁrm has to search for a manager ﬁrst. Then, the
matched pairs of a ﬁrm and a manager produce diﬀerentiated goods in a monopolistically
competitive manner.
32.1 Preferences
The world consists of two countries, home (H) and foreign (F) indexed by l,l′ = H,F and
l  = l′. Each country is populated by many identical households who own as a whole Ll
units of labor, Kl units of capital, and Sl units of skill. Preferences are common across the








0 , γ ∈ (0,1), (1)
where q(i) denotes the consumption of variety i of good Y , Ω the set of available varieties,
and q0 the consumption of the homogeneous good. The varieties of diﬀerentiated goods are
substitutable from one another with the elasticity of substitution σ = 1/(1 − α) > 1.




where E represents the total expenditure, p(i) the price of variety i, and P the aggregate








The homogeneous good is produced with labor only under constant returns to scale and
perfect competition. It is freely traded and taken as a numeraire. Home produces wH
units of the homogenous good per one unit of labor while foreign produces wF units of the
homogenous good per one unit of labor. For analytical clarity, I will focus on equilibria in
which both countries produce the homogenous good, which implies that the wage rates are
wH for home and wF for foreign, respectively. Without loss of generality, I also assume that
wH ≥ wF = 1.
There is a continuum of (atomless) ﬁrms that diﬀer in their productivity levels. Each
ﬁrm invents a new design of diﬀerentiated goods by investing one unit of capital. Thus,
the measure of ﬁrms is given by Kl. I assume that ﬁrms (i.e., product designers) cannot
manufacture their products themselves. They must employ managers who operate the
manufacturing process of diﬀerentiated goods. The production of each variety is, thus, a
joint venture by the way of pairing of a ﬁrm and a manager. Managers obtain management
4Stage 0 Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3
Firms draw ϕ International matching
z is revealed
Domestic matching Production and sales
The parties receive their payoﬀs
Figure 1: Sequence of Events
skills by investing one unit of skill. Thus, country l has Sl managers. I assume that Sl is
suﬃciently greater than Kl.
Managers are also heterogenous. Each manager has some speciality for a certain prod-
uct and cannot operate the production of each diﬀerentiated good equally well. Thus, the
quality of matching between a ﬁrm and a manager aﬀects the productivity of the diﬀeren-
tiated good. Speciﬁcally, it is assumed that the productivity level of a variety is given by
Alϕz1/(σ−1) where Al denotes the eﬀectiveness of one unit of labor in sector Y in country
l, ϕ ﬁrm-speciﬁc (relative) productivity levels, and z ∈ [0,1] the quality index of matching
between a ﬁrm and a manager. The total cost function of variety i produced in country l,




In what follows, I will call Alϕ as ﬁrms’ “intrinsic” productivity in order to distinguish it
from the “realized” productivity, Alϕz1/(σ−1).
Firms’ intrinsic productivity level, ϕ, is randomly drawn from a distribution with the
cdf of G and the pdf of g. This distribution is common across the countries. As Helpman,
Melitz, and Yeaple (2004) and others, I specify the distribution as a Pareto distribution
with ϕ ∈ [1,∞) and the shape parameter k > σ − 1.4 The cdf is given by
G(ϕ) = 1 − ϕ−k.
I assume that ﬁrms are internationally mobile but managers are not. Thus, ﬁrms have
to employ local managers for local production, which implies that when a ﬁrm sets up a
foreign plant, it has to search for a manager in the foreign country.
2.3 Matching and Bargaining
Events proceed sequentially and the timing of events is as follows (see Figure 1). After
knowing the intrinsic productivity level of ϕ, each ﬁrm starts to search for an appropriate
4This assumption about k is necessary for a ﬁnite mean of productivity levels.
5manager. I assume that international matching occurs ﬁrst. If FDI is more proﬁtable than
exports, ﬁrms in country l start to search for managers in country l′. As will be shown
soon, international matching is associated with informational uncertainty. Hence, some
ﬁrms successfully spot appropriate managers while some ﬁrms fail to do so (Stage 1).
Once the international matching stage is ﬁnished, then, ﬁrms start to search for local
managers for domestic production (Stage 2). After the domestic matching stage is com-
pleted, production and sales occur and revenues are distributed to all related economic
agents (Stage 3).
Each ﬁrm (each variety of diﬀerentiated goods) has its ideal manager. The determination
of match quality, z, is based on the “ideal” variety approach.5 Speciﬁcally, I borrow the
framework of the matching process between a ﬁrm and a manager from Rauch and Trindade
(2003) and Grossman and Helpman (2005). Suppose that ﬁrms are equally spaced around a
circle of the circumference of 2. Managers are also equally spaced around the circumference.6
For each ﬁrm, there exists the ideal manager at the farthest point on the arc. In Figure
2, when the location of ﬁrm i is represented by point i, ﬁrm i’s ideal manager is located
at the farthest point on the arc, point j. Match quality z is measured by the shortest arc-
distance between a ﬁrm and a manager. For example, when ﬁrm i matches with manager
j′, the match quality is zij′ as shown in Figure 2. Thus, the distance between a ﬁrm and a
manager, z, may take any value between [0,1]: matching with the best manager results in
z = 1 and the worst in z = 0.
Firms lack information about the precise location of their ideal manager. However,
by undertaking a search, ﬁrms can symmetrically narrow down the arc where their ideal
managers exist. I assume that this search does not need any tangible inputs. Figure 2
illustrates that ﬁrm i can narrow down the scope of z by eliminating the part of the arc
of solid line 2λ before selecting a manager. Then, ﬁrms randomly choose a manager with
z ∈ [λ,1]. Thus, parameter λ ∈ [0,1] is an index of search eﬃciency. Many factors,
such as geographical proximity, cultural similarity (e.g. language), and telecommunication
technology, may aﬀect λ. It is natural that ﬁrms can ﬁnd suitable managers more easily
in their origin country than in foreign countries, exploiting the familiarity of the business
environment in their origin countries. Based on this premise, I assume that λ equals to 1
5The ideal variety approach is originated by Lancaster (1979) and applied to the Heckscher-Ohlin frame-
work by Helpman (1981).
6As Grossman and Helpman (2005) note, consumers regard diﬀerentiated goods located at the same
location on the circle as diﬀerentiated while they are the same type from the point of view of managers.
6for domestic matching. In other words, ﬁrms can always match with the best managers for
domestic production.
Once a ﬁrm and a manager makes a match, they immediately know the match quality z,
and then decide whether or not they will hold the match. If they hold the match, they make
an arrangement for production and proﬁt sharing. Otherwise, the match is aborted. Firms
that could not match with managers of acceptable quality in the international matching
stage serve the foreign markets as exporters instead of multinationals.7
I assume that once they proceed the arrangement stage, they can reach an eﬃcient
agreement where joint surplus is maximized. The successful match of ﬁrm i and manager
j in country l, hence, sets the price at p(i) = wl/[αAlϕz1/(σ−1)], facing with the iso-elastic
demand in (2). The gross match surplus Π(ϕ,z) generated by this pair is given by
Π(ϕ,z) = zMlw1−σ
l [Alϕ]σ−1, (5)
where Ml ≡ γElPσ−1
l /(σα1−σ) is the mark-up adjusted residual demand.
Firms and managers that formed matches bargain over their match surplus, following
the Nash bargaining rule. Without loss of generality, it is assumed that any pair of ﬁrms
and managers will evenly share the match surplus.
2.4 Domestic Production
Given the sequence of events, I start the description of matching at domestic production.
Since it is assumed that ﬁrms can ﬁnd their ideal managers without any friction for domestic




In order to focus on the foreign direct investment decisions of individual ﬁrms, I abstract
ﬁxed costs for exports from the model. Any ﬁrms located in country l can export the
diﬀerentiated goods to country l′, incurring iceberg-type transportation costs: τl′ > 1 units
need to be shipped for one unit to arrive in country l′. When the good produced in country
7I do not consider the possibility that ﬁrms cannot meet any managers. This possibility introduces
additional matching frictions, that is, unemployed managers and vacancy ﬁrms. The introduction of such
matching frictions into the model may be an interesting extension. However, it seems unnecessary for the
current purpose of the model. In order to avoid the issue of unemployment managers and vacant ﬁrms,










Figure 2: Matching of a ﬁrm and a manager
l is shipped to country l′, the marginal cost of serving country l′ is τl′wl/ϕ. The match
surplus from exports from country l to country l′, ΠXl, is given by
ΠXl(ϕ) = Ml′Tl′w1−σ
l [Alϕ]σ−1, (7)
where Tl′ ≡ τ1−σ
l′ is a transformed measure of the transportation costs.
Following the Nash bargaining rule, the match surplus generated by domestic production
is evenly split between the partners. Since the international matching market is closed at
this stage, each party’s status-quo payoﬀ is zero. Each partner, thus, obtains [ΠDl(ϕ) +
ΠXl(ϕ)]/2 from domestic production.
2.5 International Matching for FDI
I turn now to international matching for FDI. Firms may choose FDI for saving the trans-
portation cost (horizontal FDI) or for exploiting inexpensive production factors (vertical
FDI). The model may include these two motivations. However, vertical FDI, namely ﬁrms’
setting up plants abroad with the shutdown of the domestic plants, does not add partic-
ularly interesting insights in this framework. Thus, I will focus on the case of horizontal
FDI. The model diﬀerentiates FDI from exports by emphasizing that ﬁrms have to search
for appropriate local managers to run foreign aﬃliates.8
Given that the match between a ﬁrm from country l and a manager in country l′
8In reality, it is observed that ﬁrms send managerial-class employees to foreign aﬃliates in stead of hiring
those locally. However, these behaviors seem to be limited only at early stage of FDI.
8generates quality z, the gross proﬁts from FDI, ΠIl, are given by
ΠIl(ϕ,z) = Ml′zw1−σ
l′ [Alϕ]σ−1, (8)
where I assume that multinational enterprises (MNE) bring their own technologies across
the borders.
The same Nash bargaining rule and the share apply to international matching. Since
any ﬁrm can export, the ﬁrm’s status-quo payoﬀ is ΠXl(ϕ)/2. At this stage, the manager
can expect matching with a domestic ﬁrm in the next stage. In domestic matching, the
best match is assured (i.e, z = 1), but matched ﬁrm’s intrinsic productivity level is random.
Thus, the manager’s status-quo payoﬀ is [ΠXl′(˜ ϕ) + ΠDl′(˜ ϕ)]/2 where ˜ ϕ is the average
relative productivity level such that
˜ ϕ =







k + 1 − σ
 1/(σ−1)
. (9)
International matches will be maintained only when the match quality z is suﬃciently high
for generating net surplus. Otherwise, ﬁrms choose exports, forming matches with local
managers in the next stage.9
2.6 Market Clearing
In order to close the model, we impose the requirement that a country’s nominal income
equals the value of the production of the numeraire good and the diﬀerentiated goods.
Since the model does not require free entry, all generated proﬁts must be distributed to
the households. For this purpose, I assume a hypothetical fund that collects proﬁts from
all ﬁrms and managers and redistributes them to the households as shareholders of ﬁrms
and managers.10 Then, total expenditure El can be expressed by the sum of labor income,
total proﬁts from domestic production, and total payoﬀs earned by managers who work for
multinationals. Namely,







where ˜ s(ϕ) is the average payoﬀ to managers who work for ﬁrms from country l′ and δ(ϕ)
represents the probability that international matching succeed, given ϕ.
9As will be shown soon, high-productivity ﬁrms will choose FDI in equilibrium. Thus, the threat point of
managers, [ΠXl′(˜ ϕ) + ΠDl′(˜ ϕ)]/2, appears to be overstated. However, ﬁrms from country l use ΠXl(ϕ)/2.
As a mirror image, ﬁrms from country l
′ simultaneously use ΠXl′(ϕ)/2 as their threat point. Thus, managers
using [ΠXl′(˜ ϕ) + ΠDl′(˜ ϕ)]/2 as their threat point is consistent.
10For example, each household owns Kl/Ll shares of all ﬁrms and Sl/Ll shares of all managers along with
one unit of labor.
93 Properties of the Model
This section examines properties of the model. In what follows, I will focus on home ﬁrms’
FDI (foreign ﬁrms’ FDI is a mirror image of home ﬁrms’ FDI).
3.1 Threshold Match Quality
For successful international match, the proﬁts of FDI are not less than the sum of a ﬁrm’s





ΠXF(˜ ϕ) + ΠDF(˜ ϕ)
2
. (11)
From this condition, for given ϕ, the threshold match quality of z∗
H(ϕ) below which home













      
relative bargaining-power eﬀect
, (12)
where ω ≡ (wF/wH)σ−1 = w1−σ
H is a transformed measure of the relative foreign wage and
mH ≡ MH/MF is the relative home market size.
Equation (12) identiﬁes two eﬀects that govern threshold match quality: the proﬁtability
of FDI relative to exports (“FDI-proﬁtability eﬀect”) and the relative bargaining power
between the ﬁrm and the manger (“relative bargaining power eﬀect”). The ﬁrst term of the
right-hand side of (12) represents the FDI-proﬁtability eﬀect. This is simply the ratio of the
marginal production costs of exporting to FDI. As foreign tariﬀ τF and/or home wage wH
rises, FDI becomes more proﬁtable than exports, which leads to a lower threshold match
quality.
The next term represents the relative bargaining-power eﬀect since this term is the
ratio of the foreign manager’s status-quo payoﬀ to FDI (gross) surplus. As either home
tariﬀ τH rises, the relative home maker size mH falls, or the average productivity level in
foreign AF ˜ ϕ falls, foreign managers lose their bargaining power since the status-quo payoﬀs
decline. Thus, in either case, the threshold match quality falls. It should be noted that ﬁrm
heterogeneity aﬀects the threshold match quality of z∗
H(ϕ) not through the FDI-proﬁtability
eﬀect but through the relative bargaining-power eﬀect. Intuitively, when matches with a
high-productivity home ﬁrm are realized, it becomes less attractive for a foreign manager
to wait for opportunities of working with a local ﬁrm. As a result, the foreign manager is
10willing to accept a relatively lower share of FDI surplus, which lowers the threshold match
quality.
Letting s(ϕ,z) denote a foreign manager’s payoﬀs, the matched home ﬁrm obtains

















[MHTH + MF][AF ˜ ϕ]σ−1
4
. (14)
Since home ﬁrms’ net proﬁts from exports are given by πXH(ϕ) = MFTFω[AHϕ]σ−1/2,
we can immediately establish the following result from (13).
Lemma 1. As long as λ > TFω/2, FDI is always viable, and FDI is more proﬁtable than
exports for high-productivity ﬁrms.
Proof. See Appendix.
The result that FDI is more proﬁtable than exports for high-productivity ﬁrms itself
is not new. However, the model provides a novel perspective on the FDI ﬁxed costs that
would be deeply related to local managers’ status-quo payoﬀs. In particular, the model
emphasizes the proﬁtability of local ﬁrms where local managers may alternatively work.11
Notice that the foreign manager’s payoﬀs include the ﬁxed payment (the second term of the
right-hand side of (14)). The source of this ﬁxed payment is, of course, the outside option of
managers: they may work with domestic ﬁrms instead of multinational enterprises (MNE).
Thus, any changes that will raise the value of the outside option, such as an improvement
of the average productivity of foreign ﬁrms (AF ˜ ϕ ↑), a lower trade cost for exporting to
home (TH ↑), and an increase in the relative market size (mH = MH/MF ↑ ), lead to an
increase in the ﬁxed costs for FDI and have FDI diﬃcult for home ﬁrms with low intrinsic
productivity levels.
We can explicitly see the relationship between FDI diﬃculty and the bargaining posi-
tion of foreign managers by considering the threshold (relative) productivity levels. The
11The literature of ﬁrm heterogeneity and international trade typically assumes that fI > τ
σ−1fX where
fI and fX are ﬁxed costs for FDI and exports, respectively, and τ is a usual iceberg-type transportation
cost. See for example Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004). In reality, there exists various types of ﬁxed
costs for MNEs to run foreign aﬃliates. The model obviously abstracts many of them. However, adding
these ﬁxed costs to the model does not alter the model in essential manners.
11threshold match quality z∗
H(ϕ) in (12) is decreasing in ϕ. Since the worst match quality is
λ, home ﬁrms with z∗
H(ϕ) ≤ λ always choose FDI irrespective of match quality. In contrast,
some home ﬁrms with very low productivity levels will not be able to undertake FDI even if
they match with the best managers (i.e., zH = 1). Thus, two threshold productivity levels,
ϕ and ¯ ϕ, can be established by setting z∗
H = 1 and z∗
H = λ in (12), respectively: i.e.,
• home ﬁrms with ϕ ≤ ϕ
H always export;
• Firms with ϕ ∈ (ϕ
H, ¯ ϕH) can unertake FDI only when matching with foreign managers
yields suﬃcient match quality z ≥ z∗
H(ϕ). Otherwise, they choose exports;



















The size of the productivity range (ϕ
H, ¯ ϕH) where ﬁrms’ FDI decision making depends on
match quality zH is measured by the relative threshold productivity level of ¯ ϕH/ϕ
H. This










The properties of the two threshold productivity levels ϕ
H and ¯ ϕH are recorded in the
following proposition.
Proposition 1. There exist two threshold productivity levels, ϕ
H and ¯ ϕH. Firms with
intrinsic productivity levels below ϕ
H serve the foreign market via exports while ﬁrms with
intrinsic productivity levels above ¯ ϕH serve the foreign market via FDI. In the middle range
of (ϕ
H, ¯ ϕH), ﬁrms may serve the foreign market via either exports or FDI.
The two threshold productivities show the following properties:
1. They are increasing in the relative home market size (mH), the average foreign ﬁrms’
productivity (AF ˜ ϕ), the inverse of trade costs (TH and TF), and the relative foreign
wage (ω).
2. The distance between these two threshold productivity levels becomes wider when (i)
matching eﬃciency falls(λ ↓), (ii) the trade cost for exporting to foreign falls (TF ↑),
and the relative foreign wage rises (ω ↑).
12Since it is straightforward to obtain these results from (15) and (16), the proof is omitted.
These results are rather intuitive. When λ declines, it becomes more diﬃcult for ﬁrms to ﬁnd
acceptable managers for FDI. Thus, even relatively productive ﬁrms may fail to undertake
FDI, which leads to a wider productivity scope where ﬁrms with higher productivity levels
may export while those with lower productivity levels may undertake FDI. A lower trade
cost or a lower relative home wage decreases the proﬁtability of FDI relative to exports.
Again, matching becomes diﬃcult even for relatively high productive ﬁrms, which also
results in a wider productivity scope where high productive ﬁrms may export while low
productive ﬁrms may choose FDI.
As a simple application of the model, it may be interesting to consider FDI between
developed and developing countries. In such FDI, ﬁrms in developed countries set up foreign
aﬃliates for exploiting the inexpensive production factor in developing countries. It is simple
to presume that wH > wF where home is developed and foreign is developing. However, the
model suggests that if we assume that foreign local ﬁrms are technologically behind those
in home, it may lower the level of status-quo payoﬀs for foreign managers, which encourages
relatively unproductive home ﬁrms to undertake FDI. This prediction seems consistent with
empirical regularities.
Foreign managers are uniformly distributed on the circumference of the circle. Hence,
for range (ϕ, ¯ ϕ), the probability of a successful match for FDI is expressed by
Prob(z ≥ z∗





For a given ϕ, the average match quality ˜ zH(ϕ) is simply expressed by ˜ zH(ϕ) = [1+z∗
H(ϕ)]/2.
Since z∗
H(ϕ) is decreasing in ϕ, the probability of a successful match increases as ϕ rises
while the average match quality ˜ zH(ϕ) falls. I record these results as a following proposition.
Proposition 2. For home ﬁrms with ϕ ∈ (ϕ
H, ¯ ϕH), the probability of successful matching
is increasing in ϕ. The average quality of international matches declines as the ﬁrm’s in-
trinsic productivity level rises until it reaches ¯ ϕH. Then, the average quality of international
matches is constant at (1 + λ)/2 for ﬁrms with not less than ¯ ϕH.
Plugging the average match quality ˜ zH(ϕ) into equations (13), the average FDI payoﬀ
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if ϕ ∈ [¯ ϕH,∞),
(18)
In a similar vein, from (14), the average FDI payoﬀ to foreign managers that match with
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(19)
From these expressions on the average payoﬀs, the following statement is recorded as a
proposition.
Proposition 3. As ﬁrms’ intrinsic productivity ϕ rises, the average FDI payoﬀs for ﬁrms
rise more rapidly than those for managers, which implies that on average, productive ﬁrms’
FDI proﬁt share is greater than unproductive ﬁrms’.
The intuition of this proposition is readily understood by referring to the threshold
match quality z∗(ϕ) in (12). Equation (12) shows that as ﬁrms’ intrinsic productivity goes
up, the threshold match quality falls through weakening the relative bargaining-power eﬀect.
3.2 FDI Sales
The total mass of home FDI ﬁrms, KIH, is given by
KIH = KH
 
(1 − G(¯ ϕH)) +






























Thus, FDI average sales per ﬁrm are given by σMF(AH ˜ ϕIH)σ−1, and the total FDI sales,
RIH, are given by
RIH = σKHMF(AH)σ−1













14Table 1: Parameter values and some key variables
Elasticity of substitution between varieties σ = 5
Shape parameter k = 6
Trade cost Tl = 0.0625 (τl = 2)
Match eﬃciency (informational frictions) λ = 0.1,0.6,1
Average productivity for domestic production ˜ ϕ = 1.32
Upper threshold productivity ¯ ϕ = 1.29(λ = 0.4),2.19(λ = 0.9)
Lower threshold productivity ϕ = 1.13
Recall that MF = γEF/(P1−σ
F σα1−σ). As shown in the Appendix, the price index is
given by
P1−σ
F = KH(αAH ˜ ϕHF)σ−1 + KF(αAF ˜ ϕ)σ−1 (23)
where ˜ ϕσ−1
HF is the average productivity of home ﬁrms when accessing foreign. The Appendix
gives the exact expression of ˜ ϕσ−1
HF .
4 Numerical Examples
This subsection illustrates how the model predicts the distribution of FDI ﬁrms with numer-
ical examples. In so doing, we need to set several parameter values. The baseline parameter
values used in the examples are reported in Table 1. The elasticity of substitution between
diﬀerentiated goods is set to σ = 5. The degree of ﬁrm heterogeneity is k = 6. Mayer
and Ottaviano (2007) report that it is 3.03 and 2.55 for Italy and France. Wakasugi, Toda,
Sato, Nishioka, Matsuura, Ito, and Tanaka (2008) estimate that k is about 1.7 for Japanese
ﬁrms.12 However, in order for the size distribution of ﬁrms to have a ﬁnite mean, we need
k > σ − 1. Thus, if σ = 5 is used, appropriate ks are greater than 4. Here I set k = 6 as
a baseline parameter.13 Trade cost τi is set to 2 for both home and foreign, which implies
that Tl = 0.0625.
First, we need to derive the conditional pdf for FDI ﬁrms. For simplicity, it is assumed
that the two countries are symmetric. Also, the eﬀectiveness of one unit of labor is set at 1
(AH = AF = 1). When the two countries are symmetric, the derivation of total expenditure
12This estimate appears too small. There is a possibility that the data set used in their study might suﬀer
from the lack of data especially for small ﬁrms. In fact, after abandoning samples from very small ﬁrms,
re-estimation generates k greater than 2.
13Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2008) ﬁnd that k/(σ − 1) is about 1.5 for French ﬁrms.
15E is straightforward. Since trade is balanced, the total expenditure is




Solving this equation, we obtain E = σL/(σ − γ).








kϕkϕ−k−1 if ϕ ∈ [ϕ, ¯ ϕ],
Γ−1kϕkϕ−k−1 if ϕ ∈ [¯ ϕ,∞),
(24)
where Γ = A1
k
 











Figure 3 illustrates conditional probability density functions of FDI ﬁrms for three dif-
ferent cases: λ = 1,0.6, and 0.1. In the case of λ = 1, there is no match frictions for
FDI so that the pdf is of a Pareto distribution (the dotted curve in the ﬁgure). Existing
ﬁrms’ productivity level starts at ϕ = 1 and the model gives the cutoﬀ productivity level of
ϕ = 1.32, above which ﬁrms can always undertake FDI.
Once we introduce matching frictions into the model, the pdfs change dramatically.
The curve expressed by a solid line is the case of λ = 0.6. The shape is much more akin
to those of empirically obtained from the data of Japanese ﬁrms. With uncertainty about
foreign managers’ quality, even relatively productive ﬁrms may fail FDI. In this case, ﬁrms
with productivities between 1.13 and 1.29 may export or undertake FDI. Here two elements
govern the FDI ﬁrm distribution: ﬁrms’ intrinsic productivity ϕ and match quality z. As is
shown in the total cost function, FDI ﬁrms’ eﬃciency is determined by these two elements.
In particular, the extent to which ﬁrms match with appropriate managers is crucial for ﬁrms
with low ϕ. However, obtaining high match quality is diﬃcult. Thus, even though there
are many ﬁrms who might undertake FDI near the threshold productivity level ϕ, only a
limited number of ﬁrms can do so. In contrast, highly productive ﬁrms do not need to be
concerned about match quality. Thus, in high productivity regions in the ﬁgure, the eﬀect
of the distribution of ﬁrms’ productivity ϕ becomes dominant.
5 Concluding Remarks and Extensions
Firm-level data often suggest that ﬁrms with very similar productivities select diﬀerent
modes of internationalization although the most productive ﬁrms still tend to choose FDI
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Figure 3: Probability density functions for FDI ﬁrms
for entering foreign markets. This paper examines the foreign direct investment decisions of
individual ﬁrms with a simple framework where ﬁrms and managers have to make matches
for production. We ﬁnd that predicted ﬁrm distributions are much more akin to those
suggested by real data, namely, there exists a range of ﬁrm productivities in which more
productive ﬁrms may export while less productive ﬁrms may undertake FDI. Such a range
of ﬁrm productivities becomes wider when either matching frictions increase or trade costs
decline. Furthermore, matching frictions hurt production eﬃciency more for productive
ﬁrms than for less productive ﬁrms.
This study also addresses the extent to which informational frictions (the lack of in-
formation about foreign skilled labor market) hurt industry eﬃciency through disturbing
productive ﬁrms becoming multinationals. Several issues should be considered further but
are left for future research. Two of them are as follows.
17Structure of matching and bargaining The model is static and a one-shot game. In
particular, the sequence of events is important for solving the model. In particular, ﬁrms
and managers use status-quo payoﬀs from domestic matching at the stage of international
matching. However, at the domestic matching stage, it is impossible for players to use
international matching as a threat point. If we allow the repetition of matching, it is
necessary to extend the model to the direction of the standard search-matching model
where unemployed managers and ﬁrms without managers continuously seek match. In this
case, the status-quo payoﬀs will be more generalized.
FDI sales The model highlights two distinct elements that aﬀect ﬁrms’ FDI decision
making: trade costs and matching frictions (the lack of information about the foreign skilled
labor market). The interaction between these two elements should be deeply considered. In
particular, eﬀects on FDI sales are important. For example, the gravity estimation of FDI
sales in Wakasugi, Toda, Sato, Nishioka, Matsuura, Ito, and Tanaka (2008)) reveals that the
variation of the extensive margin of FDI sales is largely explained by the distance between
two countries. Geographical distances between two countries can be broadly interpreted
such as a proxy of transportation costs as well as a proxy of informational frictions in skilled
labor (managers). Thus, it is interesting to examine the extent to which the informational
frictions highlighted in the paper inﬂuences FDI sales.
18A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Both the payoﬀ schedules πIH(ϕ,z) and πXH(ϕ) are monotonically increasing in ϕσ−1. Thus,
the slop of πIH is steeper than that of πXH only when (2z + TFω)/4 > TFω/2. The worst
match quality is given by z = λ. Thus, we can establish the suﬃcient condition for the FDI
viability such that λ > TFω/2.
Then, the diﬀerence between a ﬁrm’s FDI payoﬀ and export payoﬀ, πIH(ϕ,z)−πXH(ϕ),
is given by






[MHTH + MF]˜ ϕσ−1
4
, (A.1)
which is increasing in ϕσ−1.
A.2 Price Index
The derivation of the foreign price index PF is as follows. The average relative productivity
of home ﬁrms in foreign, ˜ ϕσ−1
























This expression on ˜ ϕHF is easy to interpret. The ﬁrst term of the right-hand side (RHS)
simply means average productivity when all home ﬁrms would export to country F. FDI
brings about productivity gains as shown in the second and third terms. For those belonging
to (ϕ
H, ¯ ϕH), ﬁrms obtain the productivity gain ˜ zH(ϕ)−TFω with probability [1−z∗(ϕ)]/(1−
λ). For ﬁrms with ϕ ≥ ¯ ϕH, the productivity gains from FDI is (1 + λ)/2 − TFω.
The computation is straightforward but tedious. The sum of the ﬁrst term and the last
term is given by
k
k + 1 − σ
 







The second term is much more complicated but given by
A1k
k + 1 − σ
 
(ϕ




−σ − k + 1
 
(ϕ







































Using this ˜ ϕσ−1
HF , the average price of home ﬁrms, ˜ p1−σ
HF is given by ˜ p1−σ
HF = (αAH ˜ ϕHF)σ−1.
Therefore, the ideal price index PF is expressed by
P1−σ
F = KH˜ p1−σ
HF + KF ˜ p1−σ
F = KH(αAH ˜ ϕHF)σ−1 + KF(αAF ˜ ϕ)σ−1 (A.8)
Furthermore, letting ˜ ϕtF be the weighted productivity average for the ideal price index PF,
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